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Abstract 
This paper is concerned with fictional communication, as the act of an author in relation 
to a reader. Fictional discourse exhibits certain complexities that are not observable in 
other forms of discourse. For example, the author’s act is mediated for the reader by that 
set of persons called characters. This fact generates a range of relations, firstly the triad of 
author-reader, author-character, and reader-character. But closer observation reveals that 
this mediation may be such that it gives way to another, deeper set of relations. At the 
deepest level one may postulate reader’s relation to author’s self-relating and author’s 
relation to reader’s self-relating. These questions are explored with view to deriving a 
revisionist notion of pragmatics that is open to agency. 
 
 
1. Beyond speech act theory: ‘Serious’ and ‘non- serious’ 
 
In literary studies, following Barthes (1977) and Foucault (1980), the notion of 
authorship has been proscribed in favour of studies of pure textuality. But this is not an 
appropriate step from the point of view of pragmatics, where we are concerned with the 
nature of the performed act, not only the artifact. But pragmatics has not had an 
especially fruitful relationship with fiction. In speech act theory, for example, literature 
has been treated as ‘”not serious” and “not full normal”’ use of language (Austin 1975: 
104). Speech acts performed by characters in a novel are regarded as non-serious 
because the characters do not actually exist as people; therefore their utterances cannot 
meet felicity conditions. Pragmatics has rarely addressed the question of what it is that 
authors are doing, that is, the nature of their performed acts in relation to their readers, 
and how their characters are integral to these acts.  
The alternative that will be explored is that of a hermeneutic pragmatics, in which the 
question of what agents do relative to one another is asked, i.e. what an actor in a given 
situation is doing to or with or for another. So it is the relation between the two, rather 
than the action of the one, that is of interest.  
It is proposed that in a hermeneutic pragmatics an important emphasis be placed on 
genre. To begin with, we should be able to distinguish between primary and secondary 
genres (Bakhtin 1986), so that primary genre can be compared with the notion of speech 
act, and then secondary genre can be thought of as something beyond speech acts, and 
having a different sort of normativity. 
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A genre is considered as a means of achieving a certain range of individual or subjective 
purposes of communicators in relation to one another. This is seen in the definition of 
genre by Voloshinov: 
 
It is in the course of a particular speech interaction, itself generated by a particular kind of 
social communication, that this utterance, as a unit of speech communication, as a 
meaningful entity, is assembled and acquires a stable form. Each type of communication 
… organizes the utterance in its own way, structures it in its own way and completes its 
grammatical and stylistic form, its type-structure, which we shall … call genre. 
(Voloshinov 1983: 116) 
 
The key words interaction and social communication are important for my purposes. 
Speech act theory, by contrast, has tended to concern itself rather with an essentially 
autonomous speaker, with the relationship to the other reduced to the limited notion of 
‘uptake’ and the rather marginal notion of ‘perlocutionary’ effect. However this state of 
affairs has not gone uncriticised, for example in the following: 
 
There is no sharp line between illocutions and perlocutions at discourse level; instead 
their relationship is constantly being negotiated. A text, and most of all a literary text, is 
always redefining the codes that allow us to understand it, escaping automatism and 
convention, and therefore redefining the play of illocution and perlocution. Each phase of 
the sender’s utterance has a corresponding activity in the reader if communication or 
understanding is to take place. The author’s speech must be complemented by the reader’s 
interpretive act (Garcia Landa 1992: 99 [emphasis added]).  
 
This admirable statement might be a manifesto for a hermeneutic pragmatics. I have 
stressed the phrase “at discourse level” because it is here that theory must depart, not 
only from the micro level of the isolated speech act, but also from the purely normative 
domain, in order to enter the domain of agency (Wood 2011b). So discourse is taken as 
implying two distinct things: a larger or more macro level than that of the simple 
utterance, by which speech acts are usually illustrated; secondly, a shift from the 
decontextualised and abstract domain into that of actual use. 
So when one turns to the secondary genres as encountered in contexts of actual 
discourse, one needs to pose the question of how these relate in each case to the 
purposive act of an author in relation to a reader (one agent to another), since it is in the 
nature and functioning of genre that it should provide affordances for such subjective 
purposes and relationships. Here the problem resembles the one that Searle once 
formulated as follows: “Literary critics have explained on an ad hoc and particularistic 
basis how the author conveys a serious speech act through the performance of the 
pretended speech acts which constitute the work of fiction, but there is as yet no general 
theory of the mechanisms by which such serious illocutionary intentions are conveyed 
by pretended illocutions” (1975: 332). My contention is that the problem is framed here 
in such a way as to preclude a decent solution, because it insists that the author’s 
“serious” purpose must have the character of an “illocutionary intention”. 
Searle’s most serious error lies in his thinking that it is the meaning of words that is 
mainly at issue in the overall meaning of an author’s work. He says that “if the sentences 
in a work of fiction were used to perform some completely different speech acts from 
those determined by their literal meaning, they would have to have some other meaning” 
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(1975: 324). This is an “impossible view”, he says, “since if it were true it would be 
impossible for anyone to understand a work of fiction without learning a new set of 
meanings for all the words and other elements contained in the work of fiction”. We 
have here a catalogue of errors. Firstly, speech acts cannot be determined by the “literal” 
meanings of the words that make them up; we know that the relationship is much more 
oblique than that. Two quite different speech acts might use the very same words, while 
two similar ones may use different words, depending on the context. This is actually a 
confusion of semantics with pragmatics. Secondly, words outside of their use are 
polysemous and/or general in their meanings, so that their relationship to the meaning of 
a sentence is underdetermined. But thirdly, what makes this argument theoretically 
uninteresting is the extraordinarily flat or non-laminated approach to textual meaning 
that Searle adopts here. One surely needs to distinguish between layers of meaning, e.g. 
lexical, contextual, thematic.  
Maybe the inadequacy of certain pragmatic theories in relation to fiction reflects a 
more general inadequacy? Certainly the terms ‘locutionary act’, ‘illocutionary act’, and 
‘perlocutionary act’ seem ill-suited to an analysis of the author-reader relationship and 
the way that it is experienced in fictional communication. On even the most perfunctory 
reflection it is evident that there are a set of multiple relations that need to be accounted 
for: reader-character; author-character; author-reader. As a first approximation we might 
say that the relations between author and reader are mediated by their relations with the 
characters and by the characters’ relations with one another. If even this level of 
complexity cannot be handled by speech act theory, then it may be that the theory is 
generally weak and many other complexities of communication have been similarly 
etiolated by this theory. We should consider this possibility. 
Often pragmatic analyses in fiction are confined to the fictional world itself, for 
example the speech acts that characters perform in relation to one another, the 
implicature of their reported speech, and so on. But this cannot amount to more than one 
level of analysis, no matter how deep and intriguing the fictional world may be. A host 
of questions remain: ‘What is the author’s purpose in creating such a fictional world?’ 
‘Why are readers interested in such worlds and what makes them actively engage with 
the many pages of a novel?’ ‘What sorts of positings are involved in the act of 
communication, for example author’s positing of reader, reader’s positing of author?’ 
‘How much of convention is there in a work of fiction (in the way that a speech act is 
conventional), and how much of a fictional text is a once only non-recurrent act of 
communication’? ‘Does an author aspire to change the reader, i.e. to educate, persuade, 
etc., and are such perlocutionary results of a reading part of an authorial intention that 
can be formalised?’  
Note the extreme formalism of the notion of illocutionary act, whereby terms such as 
‘act’ and ‘intention’ have been defined, since How to Do Things with Words, in such an 
astringent way as to exclude all specificity of the concrete situation in which intentional 
acts arise. Act became sundered from its purposes and intended effects; intention itself 
came to have nothing to do with effects and everything to do with an idealised 
communicative performance that was presumed to be universal. Let us now begin to 
consider the alternative. 
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 a. Memory b. Performance 
1. Convention 1a Signification 1b Genre 
2. Autopoiesis 2a Knowledge 2b Agency 
 
Table 1: The hermeneutic square 
 
This model introduces the term autopoiesis as counterposed to convention. Autopoiesis 
refers to the ways in which the self is made and maintained through language and 
communication, including the development of understanding and self-understanding. 
Convention refers to those aspects of language and communication that are normative 
and susceptible to being formulated as rules. The vertical columns distinguish between 
the contents of memory and the performance of acts. The intersection of the rows and 
columns yields four distinct quadrants, which are briefly explained as follows: 
1a. When viewed from the perspective of 1a alone, language comprises an open 
system with an unstable and quasi-infinite set of potentials for meaning. Language 
decontextualised in this way is given the name of signification, to link it with its true 
theoretical foundations, i.e. the Saussurean tradition of linguistics. All forms at this level, 
lacking a context of application, are subject to polysemy and/or vagueness. 
2a. When a speaker begins to speak or an author begins to write, meanings become 
relatively fixed, as particularised thoughts and ideas, facts, information, relations 
between actants, and so on. This includes inter alia those forms that are called 
propositions by philosophers. If 1a is a dictionary, then 2a is an encyclopedia. It is 
epistemic. 
1b. The genre of communication, e.g. the novel, stands as a set of conventions and 
generic possibilities, which are abstractly shared by reader and author. As I have already 
suggested, it is in this domain that what are called speech acts are to be considered, as 
primary genres. Secondary genres, such as sermons or novels, can be thought of as 
created out of the primary genres, but they are much more difficult to formulate as 
normative rules than the latter, even though their formal being is similar, that is, having 
the nature of a norm, convention or type-structure. They are performative in the sense 
that they are the shapes of language in action. So to deliver a sermon is to perform a 
different sort of act from writing a novel. 
2b. In the performance of writing, these generic possibilities are actualised as text, its 
actual form determined by the interests of readers and purposes of an author. If 1b is 
generic, then 2b is non-recurrent (Bakhtin 1993) and attributable to a unique agent. A 
hermeneutic pragmatics must include a focus on 2b, because there can be no true 
understanding or interpretation that does not focus on the purposive and the unique. 
Notice the difference from speech act theory: the text is now read as a datum from which 
to recover the subjectivities of those who have shaped it. 
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2. Intention, purpose, motivation 
 
We should try to determine the meanings of these three terms in a way that can illustrate 
the nexus between 1b and 2b in the hermeneutic model sketched above. Here is a 
preliminary attempt. 
Beginning with the middle term, purpose, we may define it as a state of affairs that is 
desired by a participant in communication and to which the communication is somehow 
oriented by this agent. This purpose has an inner form and an outer form. Its inner form 
is motivation, that is, the force that impels one towards certain ends, which is not directly 
observable and may not be fully accessible even to the consciousness of the agent him or 
herself. The outer form of purpose is intention, which is the socially recognisable nature 
of the act being performed.  
So we have a communicative act performed by an agent relative to another which is 
unique and non-recurrent insofar as it involves an individually motivated purpose, but if 
it is understood at all, it will be understood as an intention, that is, as one of a number of 
communicative acts that are socially defined. These will not all be illocutionary acts. 
They might involve other sorts of intention, which nevertheless have commonly 
understood definitions, such as to deceive, to tease, to seduce, to amuse, and so forth. 
Each of these verbs entails actant x acting upon actant y towards a state of affairs z. Note 
that the purpose behind these may conceivably remain unrecognised even while the 
nature of the intentional act is grasped. Thus one may ask a question such as “why did 
you deceive me?” wherein the intentional act is recognised but not the purpose or the 
motivation behind it. 
A purpose is intimately related to context; it is this person’s purpose in this precise 
situation, at this place and time. It is also intimately related to the motivation of the one 
who acts, a deep structure of subjectivity, which is other than the recognised intention 
and may be quite resistant to exact description. That is why there is the possibility of 
self-deception; one’s true purposes can become distorted as soon as they are described 
and rationalised, as intentions. If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, then it is 
surely because underlying those intentions there are purposes and motivations that have 
been obscured or distorted by the very language (and thought) of social intentionality. 
Thus the intentions that one has in communication with another are social and 
conventional, as the speech act theorists have said, but they also reflect individual 
purposes. So intention is a kind of boundary concept linking 1b and 2b of the model. On 
the side of 1b it represents an act of a recognisable type, a genre; at the same time it 
reflects from the side of 2b an agent’s unique purpose. 
Let us take comedy as an example. On the conventional side we understand that there 
are genres whose function is to amuse. The amusement of the other is a socially 
determined constituent of the act. It makes no sense to say that one is telling another a 
joke without us understanding the nature of a joke in terms of this ‘perlocutionary’ intent 
inherent in it. While one can tell jokes for other purposes than to amuse someone (for 
example to earn a living as a comedian), it could never have been the case that the joke-
form could have taken shape if there had never been an intent to amuse. Thus there is a 
sort of perlocutionary intent built into the act regardless of whether individual x or y 
turns out to be amused on such and such an occasion. The fact that one can be amused 
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by a badly written proposal, on the other hand, could never mean that the genre of 
proposal writing was identical with that of joke telling.  
If intention is the link between (social) function and (unique) purpose, we still need 
to show the role of consequences in relation to these. If we say that ‘x amused y’, we 
focus on a consequence of the action, not necessarily on the intention. If we say that ‘x 
praised y’ we focus on the intention and not the consequence. If we say ‘x manipulated 
y’ we focus on neither the intention nor the consequence but rather on the purpose 
(without being specific about it). Thus our common verbs of communicative action are 
heterogeneous with respect to these concepts. Some of them reflect generic intention (1b 
of the model), some reflect unique purposes (2b), others reflect consequences and still 
others combinations of these. 
A theory of communicative action cannot, it is true, deal with the matter of 
consequences as purely empirical outcomes. However, the same should by no means 
apply to consequences that are either intended or purposed in the act, which are a part of 
the structure of the act itself. We always recognise intentions of actions in relation to 
their typical consequences and we very frequently hypothesise concerning the purpose 
underlying an action and the unique consequence at which it is aimed. So to joke with 
others is an act that has the typical consequence of amusing them, but it may have a 
purpose aimed at a further unique consequence, e.g. becoming popular with the others. 
This distinction between intentions of a conventional type and unique purposes must 
be sustained in our discussion of fiction and its authorship. 
 
 
3. The act of authorship 
 
The following questions may throw light on the authorial act, when considered by a 
reader. 
 What sort of world does the text present, in terms of character, milieu, incident 
and relation to the actual world of experience? 
 What ideas are thematised in the work and how is this achieved? 
 What is the relation to other texts, whether literary or non-literary, in terms of 
style, content and focus? 
I suggest that a critical consideration of these questions makes it difficult not to perceive 
a rhetorical act on the part of the author. ‘Rhetorical act’ here is one that is aimed at 
bringing about an effect upon a reader. It implies that the author him/herself is somehow 
a presence in the text and has a purpose in writing it, that is, beyond the generic intention 
of simply producing a novel of a certain type. At the same time we need to keep in mind 
that the act of fiction writing is one in which the author, while ostensibly telling a story 
about characters whose existence precedes the story, is in actuality creating these 
characters. Thus the creation of character is a relation with a reader.  
Now the role of the author as communicator has sometimes been obscured in 
discussions of the so-called narrator. Following Searle (1975), Ryan (1981) argues on 
logical grounds that the “speaker” cannot be the author, since “the author does not fulfill 
the felicity conditions relating to the text”, e.g. a commitment to the truth of the events 
reported in the narration. (1981: 519). Instead a “substitute speaker” must be posited, but 
this has the drawback that “if the concept of substitute speaker turns out to be 
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inapplicable in impersonal fiction, the validity of this model will be restricted to the case 
of personal fiction” (1981: 519).1 She thus goes on to suggest that in the case of 
impersonal narratives the reader has no need to ask who the speaker is, but rather regards 
“him (sic) as an abstract construct deprived of a human dimension” (1981: 519). There 
are a great many problems with this solution, which I cannot pursue here, one of which 
is the further logical problem of a speaker (who even has a gender!) who is at the same 
time an abstract construct and non-human. But putting such problems aside, what 
concerns me more is rather the reluctance to conceive of the author as the true 
communicator. This reluctance seems to be entirely at variance with the aims and 
methodology of pragmatics. Is there no way we can say that the speaker is the author? 
Contra Ryan, I propose that the ‘voice’ or the ‘speaker’ in fiction is best understood 
as a “formal and generic mask” (Bakhtin 1988: 161) adopted by the author, and not as a 
person or being of any kind separate from the author.2 This mask is rather like the 
persona which a speaker is sometimes said to adopt for different sorts of communicative 
situation. Let us imagine it this way: that in the case of impersonal fiction what is really 
happening is that the reader grants a certain poetic licence to an author so as to legitimise 
this mask or persona, and thereby grants the author the right to speak as if he or she is 
telling a story. It is surprising that pragmatics and speech act theory in particular should 
supposedly have so much attachment to the felicity conditions of everyday life, yet have 
difficulty with an example of poetic licence of this kind, which surely amounts to a kind 
of felicity condition appropriate and unique to fiction.  
Notice also that when the narrative is not impersonal in Ryan’s sense, but is 
apparently delivered by a character or characters (typically in the first person), it is not 
necessary to suppose that the voice of the author is entirely absent in such speech either. 
Rather we may say that it is refracted into the voices of these characters: “We acutely 
sense two levels at each moment in the story; one the level of the narrator, a belief 
system filled with his objects, meanings and emotional expressions, and the other, the 
level of the author, who speaks (albeit in a refracted way) by means of this story and 
through this story” (Bakhtin 1988: 314 [emphasis added]).  
In this way even a narrating character is a mask or persona of the author, in the 
specific sense that the authorial purpose is being served by speech that is ostensibly the 
speech of another. Here we come back to our earlier distinction, whereby the author has 
a generic intention in writing a novel, a genre in which there are characters who speak, 
but who has an individual purpose, which is ventriloquised, as it were, through the 
characters’ speech. The author “makes use of this verbal give-and-take, this dialogue of 
languages at every point in his work, in order that he himself might remain as it were 
neutral with regard to language, a third party in a quarrel between two people (although 
he might be a biased third party)” (Bakhtin 1988: 314). This “making use” is what I have 
discussed as purpose.  
Thus there is a sense in which the voice of the author is ever-present in a work of 
fiction, regardless of its narrative style. 
                                                             
1 By “impersonal fiction” Ryan is making reference to use of the so-called third-person omniscient 
narrator. 
2 “The novelist stands in need of some essential formal and generic mask that could serve to define 
the position from which he views life, as well as the position from which he makes that life 
public” (Bakhtin 1988: 161). 
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Let us remember here that there could never be a fictional world that was not already 
dependent on real-world experience for its construction, some of which experience must 
be shared by reader and author for the work to be intelligible. To forget this would be to 
obscure the rhetorical purposes that fictional and non-fictional genres sometimes have in 
common. The role as rhetoric that literature plays among communicators in the actual 
world should not be obscured by an over-emphasis on its purely imaginative dimension, 
i.e. on its powers of simulation, as important as these are. Let us consider that: “Readers 
cannot be content merely to construct fictional worlds, as if this in itself were endlessly 
satisfying; they must also be concerned to evaluate them, to bring them into relation with 
the larger context of their own experience and understanding.” (Walsh 2003: 114) 
Similarly, to paraphrase Walsh, one might say that authors cannot merely be content 
to create fictional worlds without evaluating them and bringing them into relation with 
their own experience and understanding. Therefore it must be that readers sense 
something of the purpose of the author in the communication. George Orwell once 
wrote: “When one reads any strongly individual piece of writing, one has the impression 
of seeing a face somewhere behind the page” (Orwell 1940: no pagination). Bakhtin 
expresses something similar when he says: “The author’s reaction to what he depicts 
always enters into the image. The author’s relationship is a constitutive aspect of the 
image.” (Bakhtin 1986: 115). John Fowles has said with deceptive simplicity that “you 
are every character you write” (interviewed in Lee-Potter 2003: no pagination).  
When Orwell says the following, “every line of serious work that I have written since 
1936 has been written, directly or indirectly, against totalitarianism and for democratic 
socialism, as I understand it” (Orwell, 1946: no pagination), he is describing how his 
own image of himself is reflected in the way his characters and their situations are 
evaluated. Elsewhere (Wood 2011a) I have shown how John Fowles pursues on occasion 
the same sorts of ideologically-charged rhetoric in his novels (fictional world) as he does 
in his interviews (actual world). 
So fictional worlds serve rhetorical purposes, and these purposes must have a 
relevance to the actual world. They would not be rhetorical otherwise; they would 
contribute only to a kind of pointless daydreaming activity.  
Fiction in this view then is an externalisation of an author’s own subjectivity, 
whether as a matter of fantasy, sympathy, antipathy or humour. If it were not so, the 
attempts to develop characters’ own subjective life would be hollow and implausible. At 
the same time we would be at a loss to understand why certain types of characters have 
an inner life that is made richly available to us as readers and why others are portrayed 
only externally. Such phenomena reflect an authorial perspective. Žižek says: “The 
reality I see is never ‘whole’ – not because a large part of it eludes me, but because it 
contains a stain, a blind spot, which indicates my inclusion in it” (2009: 17). It is 
suggested that those characters that are represented only externally have some purpose 
that renders their inner lives irrelevant to the author; they are outré or they are 
uninteresting or they are aesthetically repulsive to the author.  
The ‘intention of the author’ is obviously a part of the pragmatics of fiction, as Searle 
(1975) correctly notes. But if one is to take Searle at his word, intention is only a generic 
concept; the author’s intention would be little more than to write a novel successfully 
(felicitously one might say). This tells us noting about the specific purpose of this author 
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in writing specifically this novel. But, as I have argued, such purposes are part of the act, 
which could not exist without them. 
 
 
4. Simulation and mindreading 
 
We cannot conclude this discussion without considering what it is that makes the writing 
of fiction different from any other genre and why it is that readers read it. It is suggested 
that the following are the key characteristics of fiction, as opposed to all other sorts of 
narrative: 
1. Penetration of private worlds. This is an inherently fictional activity, since it 
presents matters that mostly cannot be known by any kind of author or human 
narrator concerning actual persons. In fiction there are invariably cases of these 
non-observables that are presented as fictional disclosures, even if the characters 
are not entirely fictional. A hypothetical example might be: an author reports 
‘verbatim’ an intimate discussion taking place between Eva Braun and Hitler in 
the bunker between 1:00 p.m. and 3:30 p.m. on the 30th of April 1945.  
2. Representations of thought processes. This is a more radical variant on the same 
principle. Whereas there can be social and ethical constraints on obtaining data 
about certain intimate actions and events, there are also natural constraints in the 
case of ‘mindreading’ (Zunshine 2003). Again the novel can and frequently does 
present these even more strictly non-observable events as fictional disclosures. 
3. Counterfactuals. Novels frequently tell a kind of alternative history, where certain 
historical facts are retained and new ones invented (particularly at a micro level), 
so that known history becomes viewed in a new light. A relationship of this kind 
between fact and invention is a necessary constitutive factor in all fiction. It is of 
course impossible to invent a world consisting of nothing familiar whatsoever, 
since there would not be (inter alia) a vocabulary adequate to the task.  
4. Implausibility naturalized. In a novel such as Kurt Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse 5, 
events that would usually be regarded as implausible and fantastic are grafted 
onto actual events such as the Second World War and the firebombing of 
Dresden. This is how much, or perhaps all, of science fiction and fantasy, 
including horror genres, operates, through the combination of the natural with the 
unnatural or supernatural. This is a radicalisation of the principle of counter-
factuality mentioned above. 
The author simulates in the reader’s mind a knowledge of reality, a particularly esoteric 
form of knowledge, since the author offers to the reader nothing less than radically 
enhanced powers, such as the power to read another’s thoughts. Perhaps it suggests an 
inverse relationship to actual subjectivity that may be a source of special satisfaction to a 
reader. Whereas the reader has his or her own secret subjective life that is withheld from 
the big Other, to borrow a Lacanian term, an ‘omniscient narrator’ is a linguistic device 
that puts the reader virtually in the place of the big Other, in the fascinating position of 
occupying the perspective from which the inner world of another seems to become 
pleasingly transparent. As this ‘quasi-omniscient reader’, one is opaque to the big Other 
oneself, since one’s own thoughts are private, but at the same time one can also be the 
big Other in relation to the transparent thoughts of another. Surely the omniscient 
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narrator of the critics is really nothing other than our desire to be in this position, our 
willingness to grant the author the licence to put us in this position, and the authors skill 
in adopting this linguistically created narrative mask or persona that will make it seem 
that he or she is able to do just that.  
So a reader is driven through his or her own wish to insert him/herself into novelistic 
worlds as spectator and to attain there a kind of faux omniscience. But for the reflective 
reader or critic, I suggest, along with Walsh (2003), what is at stake beyond this must be 
his or her recognition of the subjectivity of the author, an envisioning of the author’s 
relationship to his or her own self. An author does not simply write to create these 
revelations for a reader, but also to externalise an aspect of his or her self-relation. What 
is supremely real then in fiction is not some simple mimetic relation but much more 
profoundly the subjectivities of author and reader and their mutual engagement through 
the simulated subjectivities of characters. The reader imagines the author’s relation to 
self and the author wishes to somehow affect a reader’s relation to self, all of which 
works through the mediation of a third set of subjectivities, those of the characters. 
A final remark on characters: a character in a fictional world is a figure that presents 
a social milieu to us, no doubt a milieu that has been experienced by the author, or which 
resembles milieux of the author’s experience. That milieu is not likely to be presented to 
us in anything like an ideal form, but in such a form as to bring out its inherent 
problems, tensions and conflict, which provide the ground for both character and 
incident. Without the character the milieu cannot be manifested, except stereotypically; 
without the milieu the character can be nothing more than an atomistic individual and 
not a realistic subject. Therefore it is for the reader to determine what sort of problematic 
relation the posited author (the “face” behind the text of which Orwell speaks) bears 
towards just that sort of milieu. We need to consider that the author’s act is a motivated 
one, and to consider whether it is not the case that his or her own problematic 
relationship to society is being presented to us, as an influence upon us. So in 
considering the author’s relationship to him or herself, we discern something of the 
complexity of the author’s relationship to us, indeed as a relationship full of potentials 
for us to reflect on our relations with ourselves. This development of the reader’s notion 
of self may turn out to be part of the author’s purpose. In this multiplex web of relations 
we may discern something of the prodigiously intricate potential of human 
communication. 
 
 
5. Closing comments 
 
I have proposed a hermeneutic model for pragmatics, consisting of four distinct 
components. Two of these I regard as constitutive of pragmatics itself, 1b and 2b, which 
fall under the heading of performance. I have tried to show that received pragmatics can 
only constitute a part of one of these two, 1b, that of genre. Even much of what is 
covered by genre finds no place in received pragmatics, and I have turned to Bakhtin for 
assistance with some of the remaining aspects. Secondly, there is a whole domain of 
agency, 2b in the model, which must be regarded as inherently part of any act that is 
performed. This is no simple matter as I have tried to demonstrate, albeit in a 
preliminary fashion, with respect to fiction. 
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An author does not stand entirely outside the work. For us the attraction into the 
subjective world of a character is first a simulation of invaded privacy, the lure of a 
simulated mindreading ability and the promise of other normally denied forms of 
knowledge. But what lies beyond this faux omniscience for us is recognition of the 
subjectivity of the author, an envisioning of the author’s relationship to his or her own 
self, as externalised in fictional character. An author does not simply create revelations 
for a reader’s enjoyment, but also draws the reader into his or her own self-relationship.  
By examining fictional literature in this way I make the case for a revisionist 
pragmatics, a hermeneutic pragmatics, which looks not only for the act of an atomistic 
individual, but more deeply for the relationship toward another. 
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